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Articles 
A Doctrine Untethered: “Passage 
Along the Shore” Under the Rhode 
Island Public Trust Doctrine 
Sean Lyness* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over thirty years ago, Rhode Island’s public trust doctrine was 
altered dramatically.  Delegates to the 1986 Constitutional 
Convention modified the provision codifying the state’s public trust 
doctrine.1  The new language was intended to overrule a then-
recent Rhode Island Supreme Court case curtailing the scope of the 
doctrine and enshrining an earlier interpretation of the doctrine, 
* Faculty Fellow, New England Law | Boston.  J.D., 2015, Harvard Law
School; B.A., 2012, Brown University.  I would like to thank Richard Lazarus 
for initiating the spark and Robin Kundis Craig, Hope Babcock, and Michael 
Rubin for their thoughtful and thorough comments on an earlier draft.   
1. See Elliot Andrews, Thomas Evans & Kenneth Carlson, Rhode Island
Constitutional Convention History, R.I. FUTURE, http://www.rifuture.org/wp-
content/uploads/RI-Constitutional-Conventions-History.pdf [perma.cc/6SMR-
FLZJ] (last visited Apr. 29, 2021); see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.  In the mod-
ern era, constitutional conventions are relatively rare.  See Robert F. Williams, 
Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing Role 
of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA 
L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1, 3 n.6 (1996) (noting that “constitutional conventions are
not now commonly used in the states” (citing Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin,
Public Discontent and the Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Consti-
tutional Reform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1291 (1995))).
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guaranteeing more shoreline access to Rhode Islanders.2  On 
November 4, 1986, the voters of the State of Rhode Island approved 
this constitutional change by a large margin.3 
Nevertheless, despite this significant constitutional change, 
over the thirty years since the amendment, Rhode Island courts 
have not recognized the intended broadening of Rhode Island’s 
public trust doctrine.  Instead, Rhode Island courts have all but 
ignored the 1986 constitutional amendment and have continued to 
apply previous narrow understandings of the public trust doctrine. 
Indeed, Rhode Island courts still treat the public trust doctrine as 
a common law doctrine, with little recognition of its constitutional 
dimensions.4  Without a grounding in its constitutional text, the 
Rhode Island public trust doctrine has become a doctrine 
untethered.  The result is a doctrine amorphous in scope and 
susceptible to the quickening encroachment of climate change. 
This Article sketches the story of this untethering, examining 
Rhode Island’s public trust doctrine both before and after the 1986 
constitutional amendment and offering a new formulation of the 
doctrine that is consistent with the constitutional change.  Part I 
traces the origins of the Rhode Island public trust doctrine, its 
codification in the 1663 Charter, and its subsequent codifications in 
the Rhode Island State Constitution.  It next examines the two 
leading cases in state public-trust-doctrine jurisprudence—
Jacknovy v.  Powel and State v. Ibbison—and discusses their impact 
on the doctrine.  It finishes by evaluating the changes made by the 
1986 Constitutional Convention and the Delegates’ express intent 
in doing so. 
Part II analyzes the status of the doctrine after 1986, in 
particular exploring how the Rhode Island Supreme and Superior 
Courts have responded to the 1986 Constitutional Convention’s 
changes over the last three decades.  This Article concludes that 
Rhode Island courts have not yet addressed the changed 
2. See infra Part I., Section D.
3.  Rhode Island Shore Use and Environmental Protection, Constitutional
Amendment 9 (1986), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Rhode_Is-
land_Shore_Use_and_Environmental_Protection,_Constitutional_Amend-
ment_9_(1986) [perma.cc/VN9H-2YE5] (last visited Apr. 29, 2021); see PATRICK 
T. CONLEY & ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR., THE RHODE ISLAND STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 110 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (2007).
4. See infra Part II., Section A.
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constitutional text, failed to analyze or interpret key language, and 
continued to rely on outdated precedent.  
Finally, Part III argues for a closer hewing to the constitutional 
text and offers a possible interpretation of the text that would 
create more stability and clarity in the doctrine.  This 
interpretation would fulfill the amendment’s goal of broadening 
Rhode Island’s public trust doctrine, providing the public with 
greater access to Rhode Island’s coast while simultaneously re-
tethering the doctrine to its constitutional source. 
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN RHODE ISLAND BEFORE 1986
A. From Common Law to Codification
The conceptual basis for public trust doctrines traces its origins
to English common law.5  The underlying principle was that “the 
title and the dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the King 
for the benefit of the nation.”6  The public’s use of these tidal waters 
for commerce, fishing, and navigation was more important than any 
individual’s right to them.7  To properly protect the public’s ability 
to use these tidal waters, the title to the land was “vested in the 
sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.”8 
The creation of the United States did not change the contours 
or substance of the doctrine but simply changed the title-vested 
5. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (“The
title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, were by common 
law to be vested in the King as a public trust . . . .” (quoting People v. N.Y. & 
Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877))).  Some courts, including the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, trace the public trust doctrine back even further 
to Roman law.  See, e.g., Greater Providence Chamber of Com. v. State, 657 
A.2d 1038, 1041–42 (R.I. 1995) (“The root concepts of the doctrine reach back
to the very early years of Western civilization.” (citing United States v. 1.58
Acres of Land Situated in Boston, 523 F.Supp. 120, 122–23 (D. Mass. 1981))).
However, there is some scholarly debate over whether the various American
public trust doctrines can be fairly attributed to Justinian law.  See James L.
Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doc-
trine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 12–27 (2007); see also generally J.B. Ruhl
& Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and
Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2020).
6. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
7. See id.
8. Id.
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sovereign to the state.9  Therefore, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, the public trust doctrine is principally a 
matter of state law.10  There is thus no single public trust doctrine, 
but there are instead numerous state-specific public trust 
doctrines.11  The local customs, history, and usages relating to the 
doctrine in a particular state are accordingly important in 
determining the scope of its doctrine.12 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has long recognized the 
public trust doctrine as an “ancient and still vital doctrine[ ] of the 
law of this state.”13  It has even traced the doctrine’s origins back 
to pre-colonial-era jurisprudence, looking at its use in ancient 
Greece and Rome.14 
Despite these common law antecedents, the public trust 
doctrine in Rhode Island is constitutional—originally codified in the 
colony’s 1663 founding Charter.15  The text of the 1663 Charter 
provides that: 
[O]ur express will and pleasure is, and we do, by these
presents, for us, our heirs and successors, ordain and 
9. See id. (“Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a
like trust, were vested in the original States within their respective borders, 
subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United States.”). 
10. See id. at 57–58; see also Greater Providence Chamber of Com., 657
A.2d at 1042 (discussing the latitude that the Shively case affords each state
in its articulation of the public trust doctrine (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26)).
11. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public
Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summar-
ies, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (comparing and contrasting various 
states’ public trust doctrines). 
12.  See Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
13.  Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1999).
14.  See Champlin’s Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1166
(R.I. 2003); see, e.g., Greater Providence Chamber of Com., 657 A.2d at 1041–
42. Though, again, whether the public trust doctrine can and should be traced
back that far has engendered scholarly debate.  See Huffman, supra note 5, at
12–27.
15. See CONLEY & FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 110; see also Rhode Island
Royal Charter, 1663, at 1, R.I. STATE ARCHIVES, https://www.sos.ri.gov/as-
sets/downloads/documents/RI-Charter-annotated.pdf [perma.cc/WYT3-68X7] 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2021).  As a founding and organizing document, the 1663 
Charter may be considered “constitutional” in nature.  Indeed, the 1663 Char-
ter remained the governing document for Rhode Island until 1843, long after 
Rhode Island’s entrance into the Union.  CONLEY & FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 
24–26. 
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appoint that these presents, shall not, in any manner, 
hinder any of our loving subjects, whatsoever, from using 
and exercising the trade of fishing upon the coast of New 
England, in America; but that they, and every or any of 
them, shall have full and free power and liberty to continue 
and use the trade of fishing upon the said coast, in any of 
the seas thereunto adjoining, or any arms of the seas, or 
salt water, rivers and creeks, where they have been 
accustomed to fish; and to build and set upon the waste land 
belonging to the said Colony and Plantations, such 
wharves, stages and workhouses as shall be necessary for 
the salting, drying and keeping of their fish, to be taken or 
gotten upon that coast.16 
Though the Charter is clearly aimed at protecting the public’s 
right to fish, the resulting effect is nonetheless a guarantee of public 
access to the shore.  It is important to note that the codification was 
deliberately written so as to not disturb current practices; the 
phrase “to continue and use” indicates that despite Rhode Island’s 
founding only several decades earlier in 1636, settlers in Rhode 
Island had been accessing and would continue to be able to access 
the shoreline.17  And the fact that the public’s rights were codified 
at all—and, at that, just a few decades after the colony’s founding—
is telling as to their significance. 
Unlike other colonies that wrote state constitutions in the 
latter half of the eighteenth century, Rhode Island persisted under 
the 1663 Charter until 1843.18  Even then, the public trust doctrine 
16. See Rhode Island Royal Charter, 1663, supra note 15, at 11 (emphasis
added). 
17. See id.
18.  Most of the thirteen colonies wrote their state constitutions soon after
the start of the American Revolutionary War in 1776.  See G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60 (2000) (noting that, by 1777, ten of 
the thirteen original colonies had already adopted state constitutions, and 
Massachusetts adopted its state constitution by 1780).  Rhode Island and Con-
necticut were the only two states that remained governed by their royal char-
ters beyond 1780.  Id.  In Rhode Island, this lack of an updated state constitu-
tion—and the accompanying disenfranchisement it wrought—was one of the 
driving forces behind the Dorr Rebellion of 1841 to 1842.  See generally RORY 
RAVEN, THE DORR WAR: TREASON, REBELLION & THE FIGHT FOR REFORM IN 
RHODE ISLAND (2010).  The Dorr Rebellion was an attempt by disenfranchised 
citizens to remove restrictions on voting.  SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT
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in Rhode Island was codified into the State’s 1843 Constitution with 
the goal of changing precisely nothing: 
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all 
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to 
which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter 
and usages of this state.  But no new right is intended to be 
granted, nor any existing right impaired, by this 
declaration.19 
It is worth noting that almost half of the words of the text seek 
to alter nothing about the then-existing status quo.20  Nevertheless, 
the text does more than lock in the status quo—it broadens the 
scope of the right.  No longer focused on a purely fishing context, 
the framers included in the 1843 Constitution the key (and 
amorphous) phrase, “privileges of the shore.”21 
B. Jackvony v. Powel
The import of the inclusion of “privileges of the shore” remained 
hidden for almost a century.22  In 1941, the Rhode Island Attorney 
General, Louis V. Jackvony, sued three members of the Easton 
Beach Commission of the City of Newport.23  In a classic example 
of a lawsuit involving public access to the shoreline, the Attorney 
General sought to enjoin the Easton Beach Commission “from 
erecting or causing to be erected a fence or other barrier on such 
portion of the shore between the high and low water lines as lies to 
the south of the property known as Easton’s Beach, situated in and 
belonging to the city of Newport.”24  The Jackvony court centered 
its analysis on the 1843 Constitution’s added phrase: 
JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787, 169 
(2011).  As a result, the state constitution was written and codified in 1843.  Id. 
19. R.I. CONST. art I, § 17 (1843) (emphasis added) (amended 1986).
20.  See id.
21.  Id.
22.  Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 556 (R.I. 1941).
23.  Id. at 554.
24. Id.  The axiom “good fences make good neighbors,” though popular in
other property cases, seems to be inapplicable in the shoreline-access context. 
Cf. Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d 1002, 1004–06 (R.I. 2010) (controversy over a 
boundary line between two properties where the opinion invoked the axiom). 
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The above provision of the constitution does not define 
what, at the time of the adoption of the [1843] constitution, 
were “the privileges of the shore” to which the people of the 
state had been theretofore entitled.  But it seems clear to 
us that there must have been some such “privileges”, which 
were then recognized as belonging to the people and which 
the framers and adopters of the constitution intended to 
change into “rights”, beyond the power of the general 
assembly to destroy.25
To decipher what “privileges” the constitutional framers 
intended, the court began its analysis by turning to common law 
understandings of the phrase: 
Among the common-law rights of the public in the 
shore . . . are rights of fishing from the shore, taking 
seaweed and drift-stuff therefrom, going therefrom into the 
sea for bathing, and also, as necessary for the enjoyment of 
any of these rights, and perhaps as a separate and 
independent right, that of passing along the shore.26 
Moving to state-specific authority, the court noted that despite 
writing the Jackvony opinion in 1941, nearly three centuries after 
the 1663 Charter and almost a century after the 1843 Constitution, 
there was “no decision by the supreme court of this state, nor . . . 
any decision by any court of Rhode Island while it was a colony, in 
which it was decided what these privileges were.”27  Indeed, the 
state legislature had not opined on what the constitutional 
language was intended to encompass.28 
25.  Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 556.  This passage recognizes a key result of cod-
ification—the elevation of certain practices into “rights.” 
26.  Id. (emphasis added).
27.  Id.
28.  See id. at 557 (“But we have not found, nor has there been called to our
attention, any instance in which the general assembly, before the adoption of 
the constitution, legislated with regard to the privileges of the people of this 
state in its shores bordering on tidewaters and lying between the lines of mean 
high tide and mean low tide, privileges which have been commonly believed to 
include the above-mentioned privileges of fishing from the shore, taking sea-
weed and drift-stuff therefrom, going therefrom into the sea for bathing, and 
of passage along the shore.”).  As explained infra in Section I., Part D., the 
framers of the 1986 constitutional amendment did not make this same mis-
take; the Annotated 1986 Constitution provides detailed reasoning behind the 
textual changes.  
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To illuminate the constitutional phrase, the court looked to 
dicta in cases dealing with the shoreline.29  Three cases from the 
nineteenth century and one from the early twentieth century 
suggested that a public right of passage existed between the high-
water mark and low-water mark.30  Such language was “entitled to 
much consideration, especially as they seem to have been 
acquiesced in ever since they were stated.”31 
Having grounded itself as much as possible in the common law 
and relevant case law, the court finally staked out a firm position 
on the language: 
[W]e are of the opinion that at the time of the adoption of
our constitution there was, among the “privileges of the 
shore”, to which the people of this state had been 
theretofore entitled under the “usages of this state”, a 
public right of passage along the shore, at least for certain 
proper purposes and subject, very possibly, to reasonable 
regulation by acts of the general assembly in the interests 
of the people of the state.32 
Jackvony is important for three reasons.  First, it unequivocally 
established that the constitutional codification did more than just 
preserve the status quo; it transformed the public trust doctrine 
into a constitutional right.33  Despite the constant hedging in the 
constitutional language that the provision changed nothing, the 
very act of codification did transform the nature of the doctrine into 
an enforceable public right.34 
Second, and as a necessary corollary, Jackvony established 
that the specific wording of the constitutional text is paramount in 
interpreting the scope of the public trust doctrine.35  Indeed, the 
29.  Id. at 557–58.
30.  Id. (examining R.I. Motor Co. v. City of Providence, 55 A. 696, 697–98
(R.I. 1903); Allen v. Allen, 19 R.I. 114, 115 (1895); Providence Steam-Engine 
Co. v. Providence & S.S.S. Co., 12 R.I. 348, 357 (1879); and Clark v. Peckham, 
10 R.I. 35, 38 (1871)). 
31.  Id. at 558.
32.  Id. (first emphasis added).
33.  See id. at 556.
34. See id.
35.  See id.
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entire constitutional analysis in Jackvony centers on the meaning 
of the phrase “the privileges of the shore.”36
Third, and perhaps most consequentially, Jackvony recognized 
a public right of passage along the shoreline.37  However, in so 
doing, the Jackvony court neglected to define the precise contours 
of that right.  At various points in the opinion, the court referred to 
the high-water mark and mean high tide line but never explicitly 
placed the public trust doctrine at a specific point.38  This 
nebulousness proved susceptible to future encroachment. 
A brief primer on tidal data is warranted to illuminate this 
point.  In descending order, the high-water mark and the mean high 
water line are levels of tidal waters calculated by some phase of the 
tide.39  The high-water mark is the mark left upon the shore 
indicating the highest elevation of the tidal water.40  Typically, this 
is described as the seaweed line—the visible line of debris left by 
the sea.41  The mean high water line is an average of the high-water 
mark calculated over a tidal epoch, typically a period of nineteen 
years.42  As an average, the mean high water line is further into the 
36. See id.
37. Id. at 558.
38.  Id. at 557 (using both “high-water mark” and “mean high tide”).  As
explained, infra note 42, “mean high tide” and “mean high water” are synony-
mous.  
39. See Tidal Datums, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html [perma.cc/X2YC-
NBMS] (last visited Apr. 29, 2021). 
40. STEACY D. HICKS ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., TIDE
AND CURRENT GLOSSARY 11 (1999), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publica-
tions/glossary2.pdf [perma.cc/8TK2-MK6D]. 
41. See State of the Beach/State Reports/RI/Beach Access, BEACHAPEDIA,
http://www.beachapedia.org/State_of_the_Beach/State_Reports/RI/Beach Ac-
cess [perma.cc/YG4H-7EZT] (last updated June 13, 2014). 
42. HICKS, supra note 40, at 15–16.  Confusingly, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court uses the term “mean high tide line” to refer to the mean high 
water line.  Cf. Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 554–58.  The phrase “mean high tide line” 
is not recognized by the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration as a 
tidal datum.  See HICKS, supra note 40, at 15–16.  Both phrases refer to the 
same point—the average of the high water mark calculated over a tidal epoch. 
See id.; see also Surfrider Foundation’s Stance on Beach Access, BEACHAPEDIA, 
http://www.beachapedia.org/Beach_Access (last updated Aug. 26, 2019) (“The 
mean high tide line is actually the arithmetic average of high-water heights.”). 
For clarity’s sake, this Article uses the accepted phrase “mean high water line.” 
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water.  The measurable difference between the two lines became 
important just four decades later. 
C. State v. Ibbison
Jackvony’s holding remained good law until the 1982 Rhode
Island Supreme Court case State v. Ibbison.43  Ibbison took a sparse 
record and used it as a springboard to significantly alter Jackvony’s 
holding.44  For a case involving the public trust doctrine, it is hard 
to imagine a fact pattern more sympathetic than the one presented 
in Ibbison.  There, six defendants were convicted of criminal 
trespass for traveling along a beach during a beach clean-up 
operation.45  A littoral owner—along with a conveniently present 
patrolman of the Westerly Police Department—stopped the 
defendants who were between the high-water mark and the mean 
high water line.46  As described by the Ibbison Court, the high water 
mark was “a visible line on the shore indicated by the reach of an 
average high tide and further indicated by drifts and seaweed along 
the shore.”47  The mean high water line, referred to by the court as 
the “mean high tide line,” was, “at the time of the arrest . . . under 
water.”48  Believing that his land extended down to the mean high 
water line—i.e., under water—the littoral owner informed the 
43. State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).  That is, the holding in Jack-
vony regarding the meaning of the “privileges of the shore” remained good law 
up to and until Ibbison was decided in 1982.  This is so despite the 1969 con-
stitutional amendments, which changed the constitutional provision codifying 
the public trust doctrine in two important ways.  First, the 1969 amendments 
removed the phrase “no new right is intended to be granted, nor any existing 
right impaired, by this declaration.”  R.I. CONST. of 1843, art. I, § 17.  Second, 
the 1969 amendments added the phrase “[t]he people . . . shall be secure in 
their rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the state.”  
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1969).  These two changes undoubtedly strengthened
the public trust doctrine.  But, despite giving the constitutional provision more
heft, they did little to change the substantive scope of the doctrine itself.  This
is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that no major Rhode Island Supreme
Court case interpreted this 1969 language until Ibbison in 1982.
44. See Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730.
45. Id. at 729.
46. Id.  Justice Shea tells us that the littoral owner had previously marked
out his estimation of where the mean high water line was.  Id.  Such conduct, 
along with the presence of the local police officer, suggests that the littoral 
owner was considerably litigious. 
47. Id.
48.  Id. at 730.
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beach cleaners that they were trespassing.49  The defendants 
disagreed and were arrested.50  The Ibbison court began grandly: 
In this case we consider a question involving the 
interpretation of a provision of our state constitution. 
Article I, section 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution, as 
amended by Art. XXXVII, secs. 1–2, provides that the 
people of the state “shall continue to enjoy and freely 
exercise all the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the 
shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled under 
the charter and usages of this state.”  The question raised 
is this: To what point does the shore extend on its landward 
boundary?  The setting of this boundary will fix the point 
at which the land held in trust by the state for the 
enjoyment of all its people ends and private property 
belonging to littoral owners begins.51 
Yet, despite this avowed fidelity to the constitutional provision, and 
unlike Jackvony, the text of the provision itself was neither 
analyzed nor even considered at all in the court’s analysis.52  The 
court began by quickly addressing and dismissing Jackvony’s 
holding and reasoning.53  The court noted that “[a]t various times 
in the Jackvony case, the court referred to the high-water line or 
mark, and at other times it referred to the mean high tide . . . .  We 
find that the Jackvony court used the two terms interchangeably.”54 
This conclusion obfuscates Jackvony’s central holding: that the 
“privileges of the shore” specifically included “a public right of 
passage along the shore.”55  While the term “mean high tide” does 
make an appearance in the decision, the Jackvony court 
consistently used the term “high-water mark” to describe the right 
afforded by the constitutional provision.56  Indeed, the Ibbison court 
had already noted that the high-water mark allowed the beach 
49. Id. at 729.
50. Id.
51.  Id.
52.  Id. at 730–33; Cf. Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 556–57 (R.I. 1941)
(examining the public trust doctrine’s constitutional origin). 
53. Ibbison, 21 A.2d at 730.
54. Id.
55. Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 558.
56.  Id. at 557–58.
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cleaners to perform their clean-up, and that the mean high water 
line would have submerged the clean-up operation.57  Therefore, 
the only possible application of Jackvony to Ibbison’s facts would 
conclude that the public trust land must be located at the high-
water mark to preserve the right of passage along the shore.58  
Pretending that Jackvony was imprecise in its language 
deliberately dismisses its core holding regarding passage along the 
shore. 
Having dispensed with Jackvony, the Ibbison court continued 
by resolving to “affix the boundary as was done at common law.”59  
It turned to English understandings of shorelines and a United 
States Supreme Court case, Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. City of Los 
Angeles.60  The Ibbison court noted that the Borax Court found the 
“mean high tide line” through the 18.6-year metonic cycle.61  The 
Ibbison court “concur[red] in this analysis and app[lied] the mean-
high-tide line as the landward boundary of the shore for the 
purposes of the privileges guaranteed to the people of this state by 
our constitution.”62 
Curiously, the Ibbison court did note that in fixing the 
boundary at the mean high water line: 
[W]e are mindful that there is a disadvantage in that this
point is not readily identifiable by the casual observer.  We
doubt, however, that any boundary could be set that would
be readily apparent to an observer when we consider the
varied topography of our shoreline.  The mean-high-tide
57. Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730 (“[A]t the time of the arrest, the mean-high-
tide line was under water.”). 
58. Cf. Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 558 (holding that the “privileges of the shore”
included “getting seaweed,” a similar activity to collecting garbage washed up 
on the shore). 
59. Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730.
60.  Id. at 730–32 (refencing Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296
U.S. 10 (1935)). 
61. Id. at 732 (quoting Borax, 296 U.S. at 26–27); see Bernard R. Goldstein,
A Note on the Metonic Cycle, 57 ISIS, 115, 115–16 (1966) (explaining that the 
metonic cycle is a period of 18.6 years wherein the new moon occurs on the 
same day of the year as it does at the beginning of the cycle).  The metonic cycle 
is close, though not identical, to the 19-year National Tidal Datum Epoch used 
by the National Ocean Service.  See Tidal Datums, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html 
[perma.cc/7XF5-YFV7] (last visited Apr. 29, 2021). 
62. Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 732.
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line represents the point that can be determined 
scientifically with the greatest certainty.63 
This is an odd comment from a court that had just finished noting 
that the high-water mark could be identified by seaweed and 
debris.64  In resolving the case at hand, however, the court 
recognized that it was setting a new limit on the public trust 
doctrine and accordingly dismissed the criminal trespass charges 
because of due process concerns.65 
Ibbison is striking for both its reasoning and result.  The court 
offered little consideration and no textual interpretation of the 
constitutional text at issue.66  Indeed, for a decision interpreting a 
state constitutional provision, the Ibbison court paid curiously little 
attention to Rhode Island-specific case law and practice.  After 
quickly dispensing with Jackvony, the Ibbison court spent 
considerable time discussing the English antecedents of the public 
trust doctrine.67  Then, the Ibbison court relied on Borax to select 
the mean high water line as the demarcation of public trust land.68  
The Ibbison court even went on to justify its decision by stating that 
it “brings us in accord with many of the other states.”69  The Ibbison 
court spent almost its entire discussion on sources from other 
jurisdictions.70  This focus on outside jurisdictions is countered by 
the fact that the public trust doctrine is a state law doctrine.71  The 
result is a cobbled together determination untethered from the 
constitutional text. 
63.  Id.
64. Id. (“Presumably, the point reached by the spring tides is the same
point as that argued by defendants as being the high-water mark evidenced by 
drifts and seaweed.”). 
65. Id. at 733.
66.  Id. at 729.
67.  Id. at 730-31.
68. Id.
69.  Id. at 732–33.
70.  Id. at 731–32.
71. See Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill
Gaps in the Legal Systems Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of 
Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. R. 649, 651 (2017) (“The public trust doctrine is 
firmly embedded in state law and has been used at the state level for centu-
ries . . . .”).  
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Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, Ibbison swept 
aside Jackvony’s holding regarding passage along the shore.72  With 
only a cursory examination of Jackvony’s holding, reasoning, and 
application to the case at hand, Ibbison, in essence, overruled 
Jackvony through quiet dismissal.73  No longer would the public 
trust doctrine guarantee a right to passage along the shore; Ibbison 
affixed the public trust line to a point on the shoreline that was, by 
the Ibbison court’s own admission, often submerged.74   
The Ibbison court did so even despite its acknowledgment that 
“this point is not readily identifiable to the casual observer.”75 
Thus, Ibbison left the beach-going public with a difficult-to-identify 
and often unusable public trust doctrine. 
D. The 1986 Constitutional Amendments
In timing that can only be characterized as, in part, a reaction
to Ibbison, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed a resolution 
in 1983 creating a Bi-Partisan Preparatory Committee to assemble 
information for a constitutional convention, and then placed the 
constitutional convention question on the ballot for November 6, 
1984.76  Rhode Islanders approved the ballot question in November 
of 1984 and, after selecting delegates, the Constitutional 
Convention began on January 6, 1986.77 
Of the two-hundred and eighty-eight resolutions considered by 
the Constitutional Convention, fourteen were passed and sent to 
the November ballot.78  One of these ballot questions—ballot 
question nine—was entitled “Shore Use and Environmental 
Protection.”79  On November 4, 1986, Rhode Islanders 
overwhelmingly approved this ballot question by a vote of 183,021 
(67.5%) to 88,046 (32.5%)—leading one Rhode Island historian to 
note that the public trust doctrine amendment received “a level of 
72. See supra Part I., Section B.
73. See Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730.
74. Id. at 729–30 (noting that at the time of the arrest the mean high tide
line was submerged). 
75. Id. at 732.
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acceptance higher than any of the [other] substantive ballot 
questions.”80 
This ballot question amended article I, section 17 of the Rhode 
Island Constitution as follows: 
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all 
the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to 
which they have been heretofore entitled under the charter 
and usages of this state, including but not limited to fishing 
from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore 
to swim in the sea and passage along the shore; and they 
shall be secure in their rights to the use and enjoyment of 
the natural resources of the state with due regard for the 
preservation of their values; and it shall be the duty of the 
general assembly to provide for the conservation of the air, 
land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other natural 
resources of the state, and to adopt all means necessary 
and proper by law to protect the natural environment of the 
people of the state by providing adequate resource planning 
for the control and regulation of the use of the natural 
resources of the state and for the preservation, 
regeneration and restoration of the natural environment of 
the state.81 
80. CONLEY & FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 110.
81. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (changes italicized).  Interestingly, the public
trust doctrine is mentioned in article I, section 16 as well.  See R.I. CONST. art. 
I, § 16.  As an addendum to the Rhode Island Constitution’s Takings Clause 
contained in article I, section 16, the text qualifies: 
The powers of the state and of its municipalities to regulate and con-
trol the use of land and waters in the furtherance of the preservation, 
regeneration, and restoration of the natural environment, and in fur-
therance of the protection of the rights of the people to enjoy and freely 
exercise the rights of fishery and the privileges and the shore, as those 
rights and duties are set forth in Section 17, shall be an exercise of the 
police powers of the state, shall be liberally construed, and shall not 
be deemed to be a public use of private property. 
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16.  Read in tandem, sections 16 and 17 provide a strong
constitutional foundation for the public trust doctrine.
Curiously, the Rhode Island public trust doctrine is also codified in statute.  46
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-5-1.2(a).  The statute notes that article I, section 17 of the
Rhode Island Constitution codifies the public trust doctrine, and adds that the
state:
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What did this amendment accomplish?  This change 
enumerated four specific rights guaranteed by the constitution as 
non-exclusive examples of the “privileges of the shore”: (1) the right 
to fish from the shore; (2) the right to gather seaweed from the 
shore; (3) the right to leave the shore to swim in the sea; and (4) the 
right to passage along the shore.82  Most significant among these is 
the right of “passage along the shore.”83 
However, we need not delve into the murky depths of surmising 
legislative intent;84 in the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island 
and Providence Plantations: Annotated Edition, completed on 
December 4, 1986, after the convention had concluded, the 
convention delegates provide a fascinating and clear insight into 
their reasoning for each constitutional change, including the 
change of the constitutional provision containing the public trust 
doctrine.85  Coming so soon after the public’s ratification of these 
amendments, and having been written by the drafters of the 
language, this commentary may fairly be termed the definitive 
guide to the meaning of the constitutional changes.86 
[H]as historically maintained title in fee simple to all soil within its
boundaries that lies below the high water mark and to any land re-
sulting from any filling of any tidal area, except those portions of tidal
lands or filled tidal lands in respect to which the state has formally
granted title in fee simple to private individuals or to which title has
been otherwise acquired by private individuals by judicially recog-
nized mechanisms prior to the effective date of this section [July 18,
2000]. . . .
Id. 
82. R.I. CONST. art I, § 17.
83. Id.
84. Determining legislative intent provokes considerable disagreement.
See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Serving the Syllogism Machine: Reflections on 
Whether Brandenburg is Now (or Ever Was) Good Law, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
1, 37 (2011) (“It is hard enough to derive a collective intent about legislative 
meaning from a single body of contemporaneous legislators . . . .”).  In particu-
lar, Justice Scalia found fault with utilizing legislative history to give meaning 
to legislation.  See John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Legislative Process, 
62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33, 33–36 (2006). 
85. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE 
PLANTATIONS: ANNOTATED EDITION 8–10 (1988), helindigitalcom-
mons.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=lawarchive 
[perma.cc/7WJE-ZSMC] [hereinafter ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION]. 
86. As a contemporaneous document written by the Constitutional Con-
vention delegates, the commentary is about as good as extrinsic sources get. 
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The commentary is unequivocal in describing the changes to 
the Rhode Island public trust doctrine.87  Citing Ibbison, the 
commentary notes that “[t]he [Rhode Island Supreme] [C]ourt has 
determined that the landowned boundary of the shore is the mean 
high tide line . . . and not at the highest tide ever reached along the 
shore.”88  The commentary then notes that “[t]he committee was 
concerned with the absence of [a] constitutional definition of the 
‘privileges of the shore’ to which Rhode Islanders are entitled.”89  It 
expressly states that “[t]he case of [Jackvony] . . . was central to the 
deliberations of the committee.”90  In particular, “[t]he [Jackvony] 
court specifically recognized a public right of passage along the 
shore . . . .”91  Accordingly, “[t]he committee strongly affirmed that 
the [Jackvony] case accurately reflected those shore privileges 
which have been in place in Rhode Island historically.  The 
resolution reflected that sentiment.”92 
The commentary on this constitutional change is clear: the 
language was changed to modify Ibbison and reinstate Jackvony.93  
By expressly adding the right of “passage along the shore,” and, by 
implication, knowing that passage along the shore was often 
impossible under the Ibbison rule, the framers of the constitutional 
amendment codified Jackvony and all but explicitly overruled 
Ibbison.94 
Notwithstanding the express description of their intentions, 
the framers hedged slightly: “[t]he committee also considered 
clarifying the definition of the term ‘shore’ as used in the 
Constitution.  After long deliberation, the committee left the 
definition of the term ‘shore’ for judicial determination.”95  There is 
some indication that the framers indulged this hesitation to fully 
At least to the extent that any extrinsic source is helpful in determining the 
plain meaning of the changed constitutional provisions. 
87. See ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 85, at 8–10.
88. Id. at 9 (citing State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (1941)).
91. Id.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 8–10.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 10.
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define the term to avoid any constitutional “takings” challenges.96  
In any event, despite a seemingly clear intention to codify Jackvony, 
at least some component of the constitutional change contemplated 
future judicial interpretation. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AFTER 1986
Despite the significant changes intended by the 1986 
constitutional amendment, Rhode Island courts have not updated 
or modified Rhode Island’s public trust doctrine jurisprudence 
accordingly.  This Part examines the more than thirty years of 
Rhode Island Supreme and Superior Court decisions that followed 
the 1986 constitutional amendment.  Three conclusions emerge: (1) 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not interpreted the changed 
constitutional language; (2) Ibbison remains good law; and (3) the 
public trust doctrine continues to be described as a common law 
doctrine. 
A. Rhode Island Supreme Court Cases After 1986
In over thirty years of public trust doctrine decisions, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has not once grappled with the new 
language added by the 1986 constitutional amendment.  Since 
1986, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has discussed the state’s 
public trust doctrine in six cases.97  Some of these cases were high 
96. See CONLEY & FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 111.  This issue raises the
interesting and unexplored question: whether a constitutional amendment 
that physically alters property rights can be a compensable “taking” under the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of 
the Rhode Island Constitution.  To the author’s knowledge, no literature exists 
on this admittedly rare issue.  As further described in this Part, the Rhode 
Island judiciary’s failure to interpret the word “shore” at all after the 1986 con-
stitutional amendment forecloses any real-world consideration of the “consti-
tutional takings” issue. 
97. See State ex. rel. Town of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 606–07
(R.I. 2005); Champlin’s Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165–67 
(R.I. 2003); Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259–60 
(R.I. 1999); Providence & Worcester R.R. Co. v. Pine, 729 A.2d 202, 204–05 
(R.I. 1999); Greater Providence Chamber of Com. v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 
1041–45 (R.I. 1995); Hall v. Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 876–77 (R.I. 1991). 
Several other cases mention the public trust doctrine but do not discuss it at 
length.  Specifically, in Providence & Worcester R.R., the court noted its prior 
precedent in Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce and Hall, but did so to 
explain the procedural travel, not to rule on the merits of the case.  See 729 
A.2d at 204–05.  Other cases cite the constitutional provision for other afforded
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profile cases that attracted significant attention from Rhode Island 
residents, legal practitioners, and academics.98 
Of those six cases that explicitly discuss the public trust 
doctrine, only three even cite to the relevant constitutional 
provision.99  Not one of those three cases makes any note of the 
added language nor purports to interpret that language.100 
And while, surely, not all six cases that came before the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court squarely presented the issue of the change 
in the public trust doctrine’s scope after the 1986 constitutional 
amendments, the court’s failure to even recognize the change is 
notable.  This is particularly so in light of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s scrutiny of other contemporaneous constitutional 
changes from the 1986 Constitutional Convention.101  And, in other 
contexts, the court has extensively discussed the import of statutory 
amendments.102  Nevertheless, over thirty years after the 
constitutional amendment, and despite ample opportunity to do so, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not acknowledged that the 
public trust doctrine was changed.   
rights, most notably the public’s right of fishery.  See Riley v. R.I. Dept. of 
Envt’l Mgmt., 941 A.2d 198, 208 (R.I. 2008). 
98. In particular, Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce attracted sig-
nificant scholarly attention (at least, as far as Rhode Island Supreme Court 
cases go).  No fewer than two law review articles and one case comment were 
written on it.  See John M. Boehnert, Greater Providence Chamber of Com-
merce v. State: Balancing Private Property Rights in Filled Tidal Lands Under 
the Rhode Island Public Trust Doctrine, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
637, 637-42 (1997); Matthew D. Slepkow, Shoring Up the Limits of Rhode Is-
land’s Public Trust Doctrine: Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. 
State of Rhode Island Makes it Simple as One, Two, Fee, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. 
L. REV. 183, 184-89 (1996); Karen Hambleton, Comment, Property Law—State
Cannot Reacquire Title to Filled Tidal Land Solely on Basis of Public Trust
Doctrine—Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038
(R.I. 1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 489, 489-97 (1997).
99. See Bradley, 877 A.2d at 606; Champlin’s Realty Assocs., 823 A.2d at
1166; Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259. 
100. See Bradley, 877 A.2d at 606; Champlin’s Realty Assocs., 823 A.2d at
1166; Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259. 
101. See, e.g., Irons v. R.I. Ethics Comm’n, 973 A.2d 1124, 1132 (R.I. 2009)
(analyzing the Ethics Amendment passed after the 1986 Constitutional Con-
vention). 
102. See, e.g., Direct Action for Rights & Equality v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651,
657–59 (R.I. 2003) (addressing subsequently passed amendments to the state’s 
Access to Public Records Act). 
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Instead, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has done the very 
opposite of what the framers of the 1986 constitutional amendment 
intended: it has continued to cite Ibbison’s holding and ignored 
Jackvony.  Three of the six public trust doctrine cases since 1986 
have cited Ibbison favorably.103  One of these cases, Champlin’s 
Realty Associates L.P., v. Tillson, connects Ibbison to the mean high 
water line.104 
Conversely, only one public trust doctrine case cited Jackvony, 
and it did so in passing.105  As noted above, the commentary to the 
Annotated 1986 constitutional amendments makes clear that 
Ibbison was intended to be overruled and Jackvony codified.106  It 
appears the Rhode Island Supreme Court has done the opposite. 
Finally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has emphasized the 
common law origins of the public trust doctrine.  This focus 
necessarily comes at the expense of the constitutional text.  Despite 
the fact that the public trust doctrine is constitutionally codified, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has, again and again, posited the 
doctrine as a common law doctrine.107  For example, in its 
discussion of the public trust doctrine under the sub-heading “The 
Public Trust Doctrine as a Doctrine of State Law,” the Greater 
Providence court failed to cite or even mention the relevant 
constitutional provision.108  Instead, the court treated the doctrine 
in express common law terms: “this inquiry will focus on the laws 
of Rhode Island and will include the customs and usages relating to 
103. See Champlin’s Realty Assocs., 823 A.2d at 1164 n.3; Greater Provi-
dence Chamber of Com. v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1043 (R.I. 1995); Hall v. Nas-
cimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877 (R.I. 1991). 
104. See Champlin’s Realty Assocs., 823 A.2d at 1164 n.3 (citing State v.
Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 730 (R.I. 1982)).  Interestingly, the two other cases, 
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce and Hall, cite Ibbison for the prop-
osition that the state holds title below the “high-water mark,” suggesting some 
confusion between the terms “high-water mark” and “mean high water line.”  
See Greater Providence Chamber of Com., 657 A.2d at 1043 (citing Ibbison, 448 
A.2d at 731); Hall, 594 A.2d at 877 (citing, inter alia, Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730,
730–32).
105. See Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259
(R.I. 1999) (briefly cataloguing some of the “privileges of the shore” (citing 
Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (R.I. 1941)). 
106. See supra Part II., Section A.
107. See, e.g., Hall, 594 A.2d at 876–77; see also Greater Providence Cham-
ber of Com., 657 A.2d at 1041–42. 
108. See Greater Providence Chamber of Com., 657 A.2d at 1042–43.
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the public trust doctrine from our early colonial history to the 
present, and we shall refer to other state and federal decisions 
where helpful.”109 
In Champlin’s Realty Associates, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court maintained this common law framework.110  There, the court 
considered the Greek and English common law origins of the public 
trust doctrine, and again cited federal courts and sister 
jurisdictions in its consideration of the doctrine’s scope.111 
The court’s emphasis on the common law nature of the doctrine 
conflicts with the fact that the doctrine is constitutionally codified. 
Although the history of a constitutional provision surely informs 
the doctrine’s interpretation, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
focused on the common law underpinnings to the neglect of the 
constitutional text.112 
As a result, with no interpretation of the new constitutional 
language, no consideration of what the constitutional amendment 
did to change the doctrine, and no fidelity to the controlling 
constitutional provision, the Rhode Island public trust doctrine has 
become divorced from its constitutional language.  Unconnected to 
its codifying text, it has become a doctrine untethered. 
B. Rhode Island Superior Court Cases After 1986
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s approach to the state’s
public trust doctrine has, naturally, influenced the superior court’s 
treatment.  An analysis of over thirty years of superior court cases 
demonstrates that the superior court has largely corroborated and 
reiterated the supreme court’s precedent. 
Six additional superior court cases over this time period 
substantively address the state’s public trust doctrine.113  These 
109. Id. at 1042.
110. See Champlin’s Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1165–67
(R.I. 2003). 
111. See id. at 1166–67 (citing State v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128,
1130 (Vt. 1989); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)). 
112. Rhode Island is one of the relatively few states that has codified the
provision in its constitution.  See Craig, supra note 11, at 4, 20–21 (noting that 
of the thirty-one states studied, only twelve states had codified the public trust 
doctrine into their respective state constitutions).  
113. Baird Props., L.L.C. v. Town of Coventry, No. KC-2015-0313, 2015 WL
5177710, at *8 n.10 (R.I. Super. Aug. 31, 2015); Humphrey v. Coastal Res. 
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cases demonstrate that the superior court routinely cited Ibbison as 
good law.114  Indeed, Ibbison’s holding remains undisturbed; the 
mean high water line is still cited as the landward boundary of the 
shore.115  Correspondingly, Jackvony is often overlooked or ignored 
altogether.116 
The superior court has also taken the same tack the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court has, over-relying on common law and sister 
state jurisdictions at the expense of the constitutional text.117  For 
example, the superior court in Palazzolo v. State explicitly 
recognized that the public trust doctrine has been codified in the 
constitution, but then it restated the doctrine in common law terms, 
quoting the Rhode Island Supreme Court to term it “common 
law.”118  In Night Sisters Corporation v. Hog Island, Inc., the 
superior court described the public trust doctrine and its 
application to the case at hand without once citing the relevant 
constitutional language.119  Like the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
therefore, the superior court largely fails to tether their analysis of 
the state’s public trust doctrine to its constitutional codification.120 
Mgmt. Council, Nos. PC 10-1317, PC 10-1384, 2011 WL 3153309, at *3 (R.I. 
Super. June 28, 2011); Night Sisters Corp. v. Hog Island, Inc., No. 04-0380, 
2007 WL 711822, at *11 (R.I. Super. Feb. 26, 2007); Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 
88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *7 (R.I. Super. July 5, 2005); Cavanaugh v.
Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at *6–7 (R.I. Super.
Oct. 10, 1997); DeLeo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, No. C.A. NO. 86-5127,
1988 WL 1016794, at *11 (R.I. Super. Aug. 9, 1988).
114. See Baird Properties, 2015 WL 5177710, at *8 n.10; Cavanaugh, 1997
WL 1098081, at *7; cf. Night Sisters, 2007 WL 711822, at *11 (citing Ibbison 
incorrectly for the proposition that “the state maintains title in fee to all soil 
within its boundaries that lies below the high-water mark” (citing State v. Ib-
bison, 448 A.2d 728, 730, 732–33 (R.I. 1982)) (emphasis added)). 
115. See Baird Properties, 2015 WL 5177710, at *8 n.10.
116. See, e.g., Night Sisters, 2007 WL 711822, at *11 (making no mention of
Jackvony).  But see Baird Props., 2015 WL 5177710, at *8 n.10 (citing Jackvony 
for the proposition that passage along the shore was one of the “privileges of 
the shore,” in the same footnote it cites Ibbison, apparently unaware of the 
contradiction (citing State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 732 (R.I. 1982); Jackvony 
v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (R.I. 1941))).
117. See Palazzolo, 2005 WL 1645974, at *7.
118. Id. (quoting Greater Providence Chamber of Com. v. State, 657 A.2d
1038, 1042 (R.I. 1995)). 
119. See Night Sisters, 2007 WL 711822, at *11.
120. See supra Part II., Section A.
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However, one superior court case—Cavanaugh v. Town of 
Narragansett—bucks the trend.121  There, the superior court not 
only recognized that the 1986 amendment materially changed the 
scope of the public trust doctrine—something no other Rhode Island 
court has acknowledged—but it also took the next step of 
attempting to grapple with and interpret the added constitutional 
language.122  The case arose when Mr. Cavanaugh, a private 
citizen, brought a suit with several other private citizens on behalf 
of the public against the Town of Narragansett and the State of 
Rhode Island alleging that the practice of charging a fee for access 
to Narragansett Town Beach violated statutory and constitutional 
rights, among them the public trust doctrine.123  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs asserted that the constitutional provision codifying the 
public trust doctrine granted them a right of perpendicular access 
along the shore.124  The superior court looked at the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the language of the constitutional provision 
and compared it with the pre-1986 language.125  The superior court 
also examined the constitutional committee report and findings 
from the 1986 Constitutional Convention.126  Ultimately, the 
superior court declined to find a right of perpendicular access across 
property to the shore in the constitutional language, explaining 
that: 
[T]he record supports a finding that the Constitutional
Convention members were more than aware of the fact that
in some circumstances they were creating a right that could
not be vindicated or exercised by the Constitution alone but
rather required state legislative action to also take place so
as to create legally enforceable access points.127
Despite the substantial interpretive effort, this decision is not 
binding on any court and, indeed, has not been cited by another 
121. See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL
1098081, at *5–*8 (R.I. Super. Oct. 10, 1997). 
122. See id. at *5–7.
123. See id. at *1.
124. See id. at *3.
125. See id. at *6 (discussing the language of the 1663 Charter as well).
126. See id. at *7.
127. See id. at *8.
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court since it was decided twenty years ago.128  Nevertheless, it 
provides an interesting counterpoint to the numerous other 
superior and supreme court decisions on the public trust doctrine 
since 1986—a glimpse of what an interpretation of the 
constitutional amendment could look like.  However, Cavanaugh 
remains the exception that proves the rule. 
In sum, the Rhode Island Superior Court has, with one notable 
exception, followed the supreme court’s example.   
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE RECONSTITUTED
The Rhode Island public trust doctrine needs to be 
reconstituted to give full force and effect to the amended 
constitutional provision.  This Article proposes three changes. 
First, and most obviously, the Rhode Island Supreme Court needs 
to make explicit that the 1986 constitutional amendment overruled 
Ibbison and enshrined Jackvony.  Even the superior court in 
Cavanaugh—the only Rhode Island court that has addressed the 
substantive constitutional change—failed to recognize this point.129  
The 1986 Constitutional Convention delegates were clear that they 
viewed the mean high water mark holding from Ibbison with 
skepticism.130  They also made plain that the Jackvony ruling 
concerning “passage along the shore” was the foundation for the 
added language in the amendment.131  Any consideration of the 
post-1986 constitutional text must, therefore, recognize the intent 
of the provision to overrule Ibbison and codify Jackvony.  Anything 
less ignores the intent of the drafters. 
Second, the Rhode Island public trust doctrine needs to resume 
constitutional dimensions.  By codifying the common law doctrine, 
the drafters of the Rhode Island Constitution elevated the doctrine 





(on WestLaw, narrow search jurisdiction to Rhode Island; then enter 
“Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett” in search field; select “Cavanaugh v. 
Town of Narragnasett”; follow “Citing References”) (showing that Cavanaugh 
has not been cited to in any other judicial decision to date).  
129. See Cavanaugh, 1997 WL 1098081, at *5–7.
130. See ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 85, at 9.
131. See id.
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from common law to a constitutional guarantee.132  The Rhode 
Island public trust doctrine has been codified since 1663133 and 
modern public trust doctrine jurisprudence in Rhode Island can be 
traced at least as far back as Jackvony in 1941;134 it is not as if the 
public trust doctrine was only recently codified.  As a constitutional 
provision, the public trust doctrine needs to be treated as such.  This 
means that sister jurisdictions and English and Roman antecedents 
are of little precedential value.135  The actual words of the 
constitution are of paramount importance; the public trust doctrine 
must be tethered to its constitutional text. 
Third, and relatedly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court needs to 
fulfill its interpretive duty as intended by the 1986 constitutional 
committee and define the word “shore” in the phrase “passage along 
the shore,” which was specifically left open to judicial interpretation 
by the drafters of the provision.136  This ill-defined word means that 
the public trust doctrine’s boundary could be at the low-water mark 
or all the way up to the high-water mark, a huge gap.137  Jackvony 
had sought to place the line at or near the high-water mark.138  
132. Certainly, the Jackvony court believed that the act of codification itself
accomplished this.  See Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 556 (R.I. 1941). 
133. See Rhode Island Royal Charter, 1663, supra note 15, at 11.
134. See Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 556.  Rhode Island courts, of course, inter-
preted and applied earlier versions of the public trust doctrine.  See, e.g., Allen 
v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895).  The role of Jackvony as a touchstone of
Rhode Island public trust doctrine jurisprudence is evidenced by the 1986 Con-
stitutional Convention’s explicit reference to it.  See ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION,
supra note 85, at 9.
135. See Greater Providence Chamber of Com. v. State, 657 A.2d 1038,
1041–43 (R.I. 1995). 
136. See ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, supra note 85, at 10.  The superior
court in Cavanaugh also neglected to do this, instead focusing on the meaning 
of the word “along.”  See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, WC 91-0496, 
1997 WL 1098081, at *3–7 (R.I. Super. Oct. 10, 1997).  
137. For a general description of the differences between the tidal data, see
Tidal Datums, supra note 61.  In Black’s Law Dictionary “shore” is defined as: 
“[l]and lying between the lines of high- and low-water mark; lands bordering 
on the shores of navigable waters below the line of ordinary high water,” and 
“[l]and adjacent to a body of water regardless of whether it is below or above 
the ordinary high- or low-water mark.”  Shore, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
ed. 2019). 
138. Jackvony, 21 A.2d at 558.
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Ibbison placed the line at the mean high tide line.139  The difference 
between even these two close lines is significant.140 
Given Ibbison’s fact pattern, where the mean high water line 
was submerged during the alleged trespass, any logical reading of 
the addition of “passage along the shore,” properly understood as 
an intentional change to Ibbison, must place the public trust 
doctrine’s protections above the mean high water line.141  But 
where exactly should that line be drawn? 
Interpretation of the word “shore” must necessarily look at the 
word in context.  “Passage” is commonly defined as “a way of exit or 
entrance: a road, path, channel, or course by which something 
passes.”142  A plain understanding of this term suggests that the 
path must be accessible to anyone to walk along.  Additionally, 
there is no temporal limit on this word; the Rhode Island 
Constitution does not say “often” or “sometimes” there must be 
“passage along the shore.”143  The word thus connotes a sense of 
access along the shoreline that is always available to the public, 
regardless of the tide. 
Interpretation of the word “shore” can also be helped by a look 
at the other enumerated rights added by the 1986 constitutional 
amendment: “fishing from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, 
[and] leaving the shore to swim in the sea.”144  Of these, “the 
gathering of seaweed” is most helpful, as the constant waves often 
place a seaweed “line” along the beach.145  Although there is some 
disagreement as to where, exactly, the seaweed line corresponds 
with tidal data,146 logically the seaweed line is at least as far inland 
as the tide will go.  Guaranteeing the public the right to gather this 
seaweed suggests that the “shore” must be closer to the high-water 
mark. 
139. State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 731 (R.I. 1982).
140. See supra Part I., Section C.
141. See id.
142. Passage, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/passage [perma.cc/HCD3-FKAY] (last visited Apr. 29, 2021). 
143. See R.I. CONST. art I, § 17.
144. Id.
145. See State of the Beach/State Reports/RI/Beach Access, supra note 41.
146. For example, the Ibbison court did not believe the seaweed line corre-
sponded with the high-water mark but indicated they did not have enough of 
a record to know.  See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 730 (R.I. 1982). 
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With these points in mind, this Article proposes that the 
“shore” should be interpreted as a flexible line slightly above 
wherever the shoreline may be at a particular time, provided that 
at all times the public may pass along the shore.  In times of low 
tide, the ability to walk along the shore will encroach less upon 
shoreline property owners.  In times of high tide, the ability to walk 
along the shore will encroach more. 
This flexible demarcation of the public trust doctrine makes 
practical sense.  For the public, the right is easy to understand and 
use: one must simply walk along the water’s edge.  For shoreline 
property owners, the ever-moving target still allows for some 
modicum of certainty.  Indeed, shoreline property owners can still 
place fences and signs above the high-water mark if they wish. 
Placing the public trust doctrine along the water’s edge also 
fixes any potential disputes like the one that occurred in Ibbison.147  
No shoreline property owner need argue with a member of the 
public about where, precisely, the public trust doctrine extends. 
The instantly knowable line solves this problem. 
Moreover, this flexibility allows the public trust doctrine to 
weather the instant and coming effects of global climate change.148  
A public trust doctrine tethered to a particular tidal datum will 
necessarily grow obsolete.  Ibbison’s mean high water line was 
calculated using the Metonic cycle, an 18.6-year averaging of tidal 
data.149  While this may have made sense years ago, global climate 
change is shifting the contours of tidal lines faster than any multi-
year average can capture.  An 18.6-year average would be 
helplessly swallowed by sea-level rise.150  A flexible standard allows 
the public trust doctrine to adapt to constantly changing 
circumstances. 
In sum, a flexible definition of “shore” provides for “passage 
along the shore” with certainty, practicality, and adaptability, all 
important facets of a reconstituted public trust doctrine. 
147. See id. at 729–30.
148. For a general explanation of the expected impacts of climate change to
Rhode Island specifically, see Grover Fugate, Implications of Climate Change 
for Rhode Island, SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/Grover%20Powerpoint.pdf [perma.cc/Q2VX-J47N] (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2021).   
149. Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 730.
150. See Fugate, supra note 148.
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CONCLUSION 
For over three hundred years, Rhode Islanders have enjoyed a 
codified public trust doctrine.  Despite a broadening of this 
codification in 1986, the Rhode Island public trust doctrine has 
languished in jurisprudential neglect, untethered to its 
constitutional text.  This state of affairs can be remedied by a full 
recognition of the changes intended by the 1986 constitutional 
amendment and a new demarcation of the public trust doctrine’s 
scope—one that is easy to understand, intuitive to use, and 
adaptable to the inevitable changes ahead.  Doing so would at last 
fulfill the substantive changes intended by the 1986 constitutional 
amendment. 
